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CAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND
EMERGENCY POWERS COEXIST?

Gordon Silverstein*
Emergencies and the Limits ofLegality (Victor V. Ramraj ed., Cambridge U. Press

2008). Pp. 415. $109.00.
Nomi Claire Lazar, States ofEmergency in LiberalDemocracies (Cambridge U. Press

2009). Pp. 179. $56.00.
The World Trade Center towers are long gone, but their shadow looms over
constitutional democracies across the globe, and nowhere more ominously than in the
United States. How can liberal, constitutional democracies cope with modem
emergencies without sacrificing the values, institutions, and processes that constitute the
very definition of their polities?
September 11, 2001, ostensibly made this question urgent, even critical. But nine
years have now passed since those attacks. And though the George W. Bush
administration aggressively insisted on the need to compromise many long-standing
commitments to privacy and due process, it is still very much an open question of how
much of this they actually did, and just what difference those choices may or may not
have made.
Were the basic legal and political structures that were in place on September 11,
2001, adequate? Perhaps we have been extraordinarily fortunate - can we count on good
fortune? Or should we use this time, this opportunity to prepare for the next crisis, the
next emergency, or even to construct fundamentally different institutions to cope with
what Nomi Lazar insists is now a part of ordinary political life. Indeed, she seeks to
"undermine the norm/exception perspective,"I arguing that exceptionalism is precisely
what leads to the great dilemmas we face when a society faces extreme or urgent
challenges.
Lazar is absolutely right to remind us that the concept of emergency as temporary
exception is increasingly unrealistic. The Cold War lasted for more than forty years; the
War on Terror could last for many decades if not forever. "The contemporary perception
that states of exception are 'normally' time bound has led to a critique that complains of
* Gordon Silverstein is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley
and a Fellow in the Program on Law and Public Affairs at Princeton University (2010-2011). He is the author
of Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (Cambridge U. Press 2009) and
Imbalance of Powers: ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Making of American Foreign Policy (Oxford U.

Press 1996).
1. Nomi Claire Lazar, States ofEmergency in Liberal Democracies4 (Cambridge U. Press 2009).
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states of exception," she writes.2 She argues that instead of thinking about emergency
and normal times, we ought to think about the conditions of crisis in terms of scale and
urgency - relative terms - instead of the absolutes of crisis and non-crisis.
Lazar's is one of a number of important and deeply thoughtful responses to the
challenge that emergency and crisis seems to pose for liberal democracy. The argument
fully developed in her book, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies is relied upon

in a separate chapter she wrote for an unusually coherent and provocative collection
edited by Victor Ramraj.
The Ramraj volume is the product of what must have been a truly engaging
conference held at the National University of Singapore. Built on a core of two rather
dramatically conflicting answers to the question of how liberal constitutional
democracies can manage, or even survive, shattering emergencies, the Ramraj volume
goes far beyond merely supporting one or another of the two dominant positions, but
instead uses that debate to build out in many directions the sorts of questions and
arguments that must be considered in the interregnum before urgency swamps
consideration, persuasion, and rational reason.
There are really four broad responses represented in these two books, with
variations of each added on. At a danger of over simplification, we might perform the
classic social science trick of wedging these choices into what we sometimes call a twoby-two matrix: the two key variables are temporal (are we to do what we will do before
the emergency or after - ex ante or ex post); and will the effort be focused on political
and institutional efforts, or will it be focused on legal and statutory provisions? This is
oversimplifying to be sure, and a number of the authors in the Ramraj volume might
need more than one box, or might bridge more than one box, but these are at least
baselines from which we might begin.
At one extreme we find what might be called business-as-usual, or perhaps
business-as-usual plus. Tom Campbell's contribution argues that while some adjustments
might be needed to deal with technological changes such as the internet and the role of
satellites and electronic data transmission, that by and large Western, liberal
constitutional democracies are quite capable of handling emergency. 3 Kent Roach also
argues that the wide array of existing institutions, rules, and provisions, particularly
existing framework emergency laws such as the National Emergencies Act or the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act in the United States already provide a
solid set of rules and institutional practices to deal with most events. Roach goes a step
past Campbell (and enters our two-by-two matrix in the ex ante - political realm) by
arguing that there might need to be a provision or process for the formal and ex ante
derogation of rights, one that would secure political support rather than simply be
triggered by executive order. 4
At the other extreme, in a sense, we find Nomi Lazar's argument that we really

2. Id. at 19.
3. Tom Campbell, Emergency Strategiesfor Prescriptive Legal Positivists: Anti-terroristLaw and Legal
Theory, in Emergencies and the Limits ofLegality 201 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., Cambridge U. Press 2008).
4. Kent Roach, Ordinary Laws for Emergencies and Democratic Derogations from Rights, in
Emergencies and the Limits of Legality, supra n. 3, at 234.
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need a fundamentally different set of institutions, a set that is designed to cope with the
full range of challenges, and makes no temporal distinction between the emergency
exception and ordinary governance. Hers is an ex ante proposition, and one that spans
the political as well as the legal categories of our typology. I will return to her arguments
below.
Most lawyers, and indeed most politicians in liberal democracies, were chastened
by 9/11 (not to mention July 7, 2005, when bombs ripped through the London
transportation system, or the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India) and began to wonder, as
5
Victor Ramraj puts it in his introduction, "can liberalism survive an emergency?"
The debate that sparked the Ramraj volume was joined by David Dyzenhaus and
Oren Gross. Dyzenhaus insists on formal, explicit, legal limits, understanding as he does
that law, to be law, must abide by hard moral limits and barriers that cannot be
compromised. While one might set up a wide variety of regimes within that moral
boundary (and therefore might construct a less solicitous regime for emergencies than
that for dealing with ordinary times) one might never cross the line from the legal to the
illegal. Courts, he assumes (or hopes), will patrol and enforce that line.
Gross has no confidence that such barriers will hold. Confronted with dramatic
emergencies and crisis conditions, people will abandon the formal barriers constructed in
less challenging times. If we build these exceptions into the law ex ante, he worries we
will all too quickly wind up with the sorts of solutions proposed by Carl Schmitt, whose
6
looming presence haunts almost every page of both of these books.
Better to invite political leaders to do what they believe they must, turning to posthoc "ratification" or exoneration rather than to allocate and formally delegate special
extraordinary emergency powers ex ante. Gross argues that such moves will be ad hoc,
and that leaders will have to carefully consider whether or not they likely can receive
post-hoc ratification before acting. This uncertainty, he insists, will be the essential
restraint against the abuse of power.
Dyzenhaus is not persuaded. To legalize the unlegalizable is a contradiction for
Dyzenhaus who insists that the legal and the moral are and must be the same. The rule of
law is not a simple set of rules, but rather the expression of a noncompromisable set of
moral commitments. Dyzenhaus is convinced that judges can and will patrol and protect
these legal and moral borders and while he is quite willing to accept ex ante emergency
provisions, such provisions cannot cross these hard legal-moral lines.
Around these two dominant arguments, other chapters in the Ramraj volume
consider the problem from the perspective of non-Western democracies (Rueban
Balasubramaniam focuses on the question of indefinite detention, using the very
important and instructive examples of Malaysia and Singapore, 7 while Johan Geertsema
5. Victor Ramraj, No Doctrine More Pernicious?Emergencies and the Limits ofLegality, in Emergencies
and the Limits of Legality, supra n. 3, at 6.

6. Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke U. Press 2007); Carl Schmitt, The
Crisis ofParliamentaryDemocracy (Ellen Kennedy, trans., MIT Press 1988).
7. Rueban Balasubramaniam, Indefinite Detention: Rule by Law or Rule of Law, in Emergencies and the

Limits of Legality, supra n. 3, at 119-141. For related argument concerning Singapore, Hong Kong, and China
and the rule of law, see Gordon Silverstein, Globalization and the Rule ofLaw: A Machine That Runs ofItself?,

1 ICON: Intl. J. Const. L. 427 (2003), and Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules
Matter, in Rule by Law: The Politicsof Courts in AuthoritarianRegimes 73 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa
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considers the lasting impact of colonialism in the development of emergency power
regimes, and Kanishka Jayasuriya examines the problem from the transnational and
international perspective). 8
Others consider the problem from a more institutional perspective, with William
Scheuerman arguing that the elephant in the room - the United States - is in a
particularly awkward position thanks to its nearly unique, and uniquely unsuited, version
of presidentialism, where a chief executive serves a four-year term, faces only one
possibility of reelection, and functions atop a stunningly fragmented political system of
separated powers and checks and balances. These institutional constraints lead
Scheuerman to embrace ex ante framework legislation which, though it cannot prevent
abuse, might at least cabin its range and damage.
Moving firmly to the political and institutional box in the matrix, Mark Tushnet
argues that the proper debate should not be over "how law should regulate the exercise of
emergency powers," but rather, should acknowledge the possibility that the real solution
will lie in ordinary politics, that "the institutions of ordinary politics can be the vehicle
for normative regulation of the exercise of emergency powers." 9 Tushnet insists that
formal legal rules and rulings are limited in their ability to restrain abuse of power - that
any restraint will have to be the product not of new statutes, but of old and deeply
ingrained practices, professional norms, bureaucratic routines, and the far deeper
commitments to shared values and norms that cannot be imposed by framework laws,
but must be learned and absorbed over time.
Indeed, Tushnet notes that realists understand that the only effective "constraints
on the exercise of power result from sociology and politics."1 0 This is, I think, something
that Oren Gross understands, but is reluctant to fully embrace and instead develops a
model that is far more legalistic in its sensibilities and language. It is, I think, precisely
because Gross is so deeply tied to a classical legal framework that he opens himself to
some of the deeper and more troubling critiques posed by some of the other authors in
the Ramraj volume.
Indeed, Gross points to a classic, political model in searching for a way to maintain
a commitment to hard and explicit constitutional and legal barriers and limits, and yet
finds a way to make it possible for societies to confront and manage fundamental crisis
and emergency.
The model Gross points to is Cicero who foiled a conspiracy that would have led
to the invasion of Rome. Having successfully foiled the conspiracy, Cicero argued
vehemently for the summary execution of the conspirators - something that was beyond
his legal right, indeed, something beyond the legal rights of the Senate since those to be
executed were Roman citizens and could not be executed without a full trial. Cicero
nevertheless ordered the executions, and suffered the consequences: He was condemned

eds., Cambridge U. Press 2008).
8. John Geertsema, Exceptions, Bare Life, and Colonialism, and Kanishka Jayasuriya, Struggle over
Legality in the Midnight Hour: Governing the InternationalState of Emergency in Emergencies and the Limits
ofLegality, supra n. 3, at 337 & 360.
9. Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Conceptual Issues, in
Emergencies and the Limits ofLegality, supra n. 3, at 145-146.
10. Id. at 150.
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by the Senate, and escaped from Rome into exile, his "house was demolished and his
property confiscated." 1 1 Ultimately, Cicero was allowed to return to Rome to some
measure of public acclaim. But, as Gross notes, Cicero may have been allowed to return
to Rome, but this did not "expunge that earlier experience nor did it act to legalise his
earlier actions.,,12 In short, Cicero did what he felt he had to do, and suffered the
consequences. And, Gross insists, the Cicero model is one that maintains a critical
degree of uncertainty - leaders might have to embrace what he calls "extra-legal"
policies, but they will be restrained by genuine uncertainty about whether or not their
actions will be ratified and exonerated after the fact. Uncertainty, ambiguity, would be
the key to making this a last resort and one that presidents would be exceedingly cautious
in exercising.
Law is about formality, precision, definitions, borders, and boundaries. But laws
ultimately are only effective if people follow them and abide by them. Without that, they
are little more than what James Madison called "parchment barriers." 13 Merely writing
these things down would do little good. Formal lines between the branches of
government would mean little if the "interests of the man" were not "connected with the
constitutional" power and rights of each of the institutions or branches involved. Yes,
leaders need to have "the necessary constitutional means" to keep the others at bay, but
at least equally important was the need to be confident that they would also have the
-personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." 1 4
This same concern about mere parchment barriers came up as well in an exchange
of letters between Madison and Jefferson over the efficacy of adding a bill of rights to
the Constitution. Written bills of rights, Madison wrote in 1788, prove least effective "on
those occasions when its controul [sic] is most needed." 15 But in the end, Madison
conceded that written provisions might be useful if by doing so it would help embed
those principles in the hearts and minds of American citizens. "The political truths
declared in that solemn manner, acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims
of free Government," Madison wrote, "and as they become incorporated with the
National sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion."l6 Indeed, they
might also be available as something of a touchstone, something that might serve as "a
good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community" in those instances when the
abuse of rights would stem not from its most likely source (tyranny of the majority), but
rather at the hands of government officials, and a popular resistance was needed to blunt
or end those abuses.
This then might blend well with some version of the Gross project: the idea being
that while the executive ultimately will do what he feels he must to fulfill his oath of
11. Oren Gross, Extra-legality and the Ethic of PoliticalResponsibility in Emergencies and the Limits of
Legality, supra n. 3, at 70.
12. Id. at 71.
13. James Madison, The Federalist Papers: The Federalist No. 48 (Feb. 1, 1788) (available at
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm).
14.

James Madison, The Federalist Papers: The Federalist No. 51 (Feb. 8,

1788) (available at

http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm).
15. Ltr. from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) (available at http://www.revolutionarywar-and-beyond.com/james-madison-letter-to-thomas-jefferson-october-1 7-1788.html).
16. Id.
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office, and preserve, protect, and defend the nation as well as its constitution, he or she
will, it is hoped, exercise self-restraint not only because future ratification or vindication
is uncertain, but also because leaders (and their constituents) who hold deeply engrained
beliefs and values will be loath to violate those concepts and commitments.
Tushnet attributes a great deal of importance to what he calls "bureaucratic
constraints" - what, for example, has kept American troops in their barracks all these
decades? Why is it that despite vicious political campaigns, the United States has never
failed to successfully (and peacefully) transition from one presidential regime to another:
John Adams stepped aside for Thomas Jefferson; Herbert Hoover for Franklin Roosevelt;
Lyndon Johnson for Richard Nixon; George H.W. Bush for William Jefferson Clinton,
and he for George W. Bush who, in turn, left the White House in the hands of Barack
Obama. While the "American Creed" has been sorely tested, and contains within it
stunning examples of cognitive dissonance, it is this creed which is the ultimate
safeguard and only reliably effective restraint against the abuse of power and the
wholesale violation of rights in the face of crisis and emergency. 17 Bureaucrats, judges,
and politicians alike - as do most professionals - "define their roles with reference to
norms they have internalized." 1 8
This seems the missing element in these and, frankly, almost all of the work on
emergency powers that has been generated since September 2001. How can we inculcate
and more deeply embed these values and norms and professional standards and how can
we fashion institutions that will make it less and not more likely that leaders and
government officials will violate those norms, values, and commitments?
Taking the second challenge first, Gross is, I think, onto something when he talks
about uncertainty or perhaps ambiguity, a term which may more fully cover the political
as well as the legal terrain. Ambiguity is a lynchpin of Madison's mechanical separation
of powers, or, more accurately, as Richard Neustadt would have it, a system of "separate
institutions sharing power." 1 9 To make this work there had to be ambiguity - it had to be
unclear where the power of one branch ended and the power of another began.
Ambiguity would generate struggle, and, as long as there was a tug-of-war for power,
each branch - ambitious to maximize its own power - would check the ambitions of the
others.
Ambiguity is particularly important for the Madisonian constitution when it comes
to war and foreign policy. This is well captured in Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence
in the Steel Seizure Case,20 where he outlined three zones that had no clear boundaries
between them. While there would be cases where the president's actions, fully supported
by Congress, were on the strongest constitutional footing and, at the other extreme,
where a president, acting against the will of Congress, would be on the thinnest of ice,
there would be cases in between, cases in what Jackson called the "zone of twilight."
Here presidents would have to tread exceedingly cautiously, for their authority was

17.

See Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony (Harv. U. Press 1984).

18. Tushnet, supra n. 9, at 155.
19.

Richard Neustadt, PresidentialPower: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and

Nixon 12 (John Wiley 1976).
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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ambiguous, as were the boundaries on either side. Ambiguity might not prevent a
president from overreaching (as, indeed, Harry Truman did in the Steel Case itself), but
ambiguity would make sure the president would reach without confidence, and in that
lack of confidence would reside a great deal of protection against abuse of power. As
long as this zone remains ambiguous, indeed, the more ambiguous it might be, the more
the president would be forced to clearly and explicitly take responsibility for his or her
actions. The more we define the boundaries and borders of power, the more we construct
and develop explicit frameworks, allocations, definitions, and provisions for emergency,
the less cautious the president will likely become. If there are statutes, provisions, rules,
and exceptions, then the president will find lawyers capable of navigating those
provisions, capable of finding and articulating arguments that will legalize what the
president chooses to do. In a world of statutes, rules, and parchment barriers in what Jack
2 1 the Bush
Goldsmith called the "post-Watergate hyper-legalization of warfare,"
administration actually could at least attempt to construct legal arguments to support
their actions - there were all sorts of statutes and provisions to interpret and reconstruct:
far from limiting any abuse or overreach, these laws and rules meant that the president
would "do what he had to do to protect the country. And the lawyers had to find some
way to make what he did legal." 2 2 Would it have been any better had the field not been
so littered with these provisions? That is a counterfactual that is impossible to test, but
we might well have had a far healthier debate had the president been forced to accept
full, personal responsibility for his actions, and not have a complex and overlapping set
of statutes to provide legal cover.
Mark Tushnet is an exception among legal writers - he understands that politics
and the structure of institutions are the far more promising means of managing
unexpected emergencies. For most, the lack of legal structures is distinctly worrisome.
They insist on ex ante rules and statutes. 2 3 And when these fail as did the War Powers
Resolution of 1973, the answer tends to be that we need more law, better law, rather than
that perhaps we need to actually force all three branches to take political responsibility
for war policies.24 Ours is a political culture in which "social problems increasingly are
approached as problems to be solved through comprehensive legal strategies."25 When
these comprehensive approaches fail to work, rather than questioning these legalistic
efforts, the failure often "is attributed to poor drafting and not enough law; typically the
solution is 'smarter' legal interventions." 2 6 As Karl Llewellyn reminds novice law
27
students, in America there is "no cure for law but more law."

21. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration 81 (W.W.
Norton 2007).
22. Id.
23. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism (Yale U. Press 2007).
24. See generally Gordon Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers: ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Making
ofAmerican ForeignPolicy (Oxford U. Press 1996).
25. Katy Harriger, The Special Prosecutorin American Politics 12 (2d ed., U. Press Kan. 2000) (quoting
Frank Anechiarico & James Jacob, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes
Government Ineffective (U. Chi. Press 1996)).
26. Id. at 12.
27. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 102-108 (Oceana Publications 1960).
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Law, of course, facilitates a role for judges, and it is independent judges in whom
David Dyzenhaus places his confidence. And, indeed, judges are more insulated and
more likely to be able to resist some of the pressure to trade liberty for security in time of
crisis. But while their institutional isolation and professional norms and training all
suggest reasons to believe they might be less likely to give in, or slower or more
resistant, there is no reason to believe they are utterly immune to the same pressures,
biases and fears of other leaders and other citizens. Faced with what they are convinced
is a society-threatening crisis, why would we really expect them to stand against an
overwhelming tide? Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of such a situation that Justice
Jackson so cogently addressed in his dissent in Korematsu. At the end of the day, he did
as Dyzenhaus would expect Supreme Court Justices to do, and voted to uphold the
underlying moral and normative values of American law - but his was, let us remember,
a dissent. The majority voted to allow the government's relocation of Japanese
Americans without even the most rudimentary wave at due process.
This really should not surprise us. As Lee Epstein and her colleagues demonstrate,
Supreme Court rulings in civil liberties cases during formal periods of wartime tend to be
less favorable to individual rights than in non-war circumstances. 28 Together with John
Hanley, I have argued that in crisis times (periods more broadly defined than when the
nation is formally at war) the Justices of the Supreme Court (rather unsurprisingly) tend
to rule in a way that is more or less consistent with public opinion. When emergency
power claims arise at the peak of presidential popularity (as happened with Korematsu),
the Court is loathe to stand in the way; where cases arise concerning highly unpopular
claims to power (as was the case with Truman and the steel seizure), the Court has sided
with individual rights and against the president. This is not a causal claim - but more a
recognition that judges are people too, and while they may lead public opinion, in the
midst of crisis, they are not often likely to stand in direct opposition to it. 29
This is not to say that Courts cannot play a vitally important role, but we might
want to think about the courts ex ante role in building and fortifying the norms and
values of our society in advance such that they are more likely to be able to withstand
cross pressures in a future crisis. But the time and place for the Court to play its most
important role might well not be in the midst of a genuine (or perceived) threat to
national survival.
Call this the Milligan model, named after Ex parte Milligan,30 a Civil War case
that did not reach the Circuit Court of Appeals until the war had ended. Milligan is
remembered as one of the most soaring and uncompromising Court statements on the
sanctity of individual rights, even in time of war. And, if you believe in the importance
of embedded commitments and deeply rooted norms and beliefs, then indeed these words
that are so deeply etched in our collective conscience have no doubt raised the costs and
lowered the possibility of similar abuses in the future. "The Constitution," Justice Davis

28. Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Effect of War on the Supreme Court, 8
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
29.

Gordon Silverstein & John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of War and Crisis,

61 Hastings L.J. 1453 (2010).
30. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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wrote in Milligan,
is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine
involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
31
of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
Could those words have been written in the midst of the Civil War'? And if not,
how much worse would it have been had the Court not simply ignored Milligan and
others who had been sentenced by military commissions despite the fact that the federal
courts were open and functioning at the time, but ruled that the president had the
authority to bypass Article III on the claim of military necessity? This is precisely what
Justice Jackson worried about in his dissent in the Korematsu case, where he indicated
that it would have been a far better thing for the Court to have sidestepped this case in
the midst of a war, rather than doing what most of them felt could not be avoided
(allowing the government to act in the face of crisis). Instead of waiting until the war had
ended, a ruling that actually provided constitutional sanction for the racial segregation of
citizens on the West Coast without even rudimentary due process was now and continues
to be a precedent available for some future crisis. The principle that "racial
discrimination in criminal procedure" is constitutionally permissible, now "lies about
like a loaded weapon" and every repetition of that principle imbeds it "more deeply in
32
our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes."
Thus law and judges can play a vital role in advancing the sort of thick version of
the rule of law advocated by David Dyzenhaus - but to rely exclusively on judges,
statutes, and formal parchment barriers may be unrealistic. Our attention really needs to
shift to how we might more deeply embed these values and ideals ahead of time, as well
as how we might design institutions that will make this more, rather than less, likely.
Nomi Lazar is particularly concerned with institutional design, but her concern is
that we reorder our priorities away from fetishizing the institutions as they have evolved
and focus instead on whether or not the institutions are well designed to maximize our
shared values and our shared objectives of a good and moral life.
In States of Emergency, Lazar starts with a simple and powerful assertion: liberty
requires order. Empirically, this is hard to refute. And, even if it could be refuted, people
believe it to be true and therefore, whether empirically true or not, it will shape and guide
behavior. What that means is that given the choice (even a false choice) between a
sacrifice of liberty and a sacrifice of safety, most people, most of the time, choose safety,
or the promise of safety.
Up to now, our tendency has been to believe we could limit this temptation to
periods of crisis, to emergencies, with the unspoken assumption that these are by
definition temporary, and indeed, relatively short periods. We might tolerate these
excesses precisely because we expect to return to ordinary times, and full protections for
rights in short order. But Lazar insists it is time for us to recognize the risks inherent in
this distinction. It is, she writes, time to rethink government power in a way that might

31.

Id. at 76.

32. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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"undermine the norm/exception perspective." 33
Lazar is absolutely right to remind us that the concept of emergency as temporary
exception is increasingly unrealistic. The Cold War lasted for more than forty years; the
War on Terror could last for many decades yet to come. "[T]he contemporary perception
that states of exception are *normally' time bound has led to a critique that complains of
states of exception," she writes. 34 And exceptions are dangerous things, made all the
more dangerous when there really is no outer limit on when the need for that exception
might end. And so she argues that we need a regime designed to manage all
circumstances, urgent and not urgent, catastrophic and ordinary. If this means we need
new and different institutions we should embrace that challenge as an opportunity. After
all, she writes in the Ramraj volume, institutions are and should be "means to normative
ends." 3 5 Institutions, which are the means to the ends of an Aristotelian good life in the
work of John Locke, Lazar argues, become the "embodiments of first principles," in
Kantian liberalism, the "instantiations of ends" rather than as a means to those ends. 36
If emergencies lead to exceptions, and if we are unwilling to redesign our
institutions to manage emergencies as a regular part of liberal democracy, then Lazar
worries that we really are setting ourselves up to confirm Schmitt's charge "that
liberalism cannot confront emergencies without collapsing." 3 7 This then suggests that
flexibility in institutional design may actually be morally required if this is the only way
to move us closer to a moral and just life.
Lazar is certainly right to think that emergencies are no longer likely to be easily
cabined periods of exception. Madison certainly would have no quarrel with tinkering
with institutional design to respond to changing demands and incentives in a very
different era. But there is, I think, a missing element. This is not simply a question of
ends and institutional means to those ends. There is a third element which, for many,
may be even more central that either the normative ends or the institutional means - and
that is the process by which we construct institutions, arrive at, agree upon, and
renegotiate those ends.
In his closing statement after Lt. Colonel Oliver North's testimony before the
Select Committee of the House and Senate investigating the Iran-Contra affairs in 1987,
Chairman Lee Hamilton insisted that the means are at least as important as the ends. "A
democratic government, as I understand it," Hamilton said, "is not a solution, but it's a
way of seeking solutions. It's not a government devoted to a particular objective, but a
form of government which specifies means and methods of achieving objectives.
Methods and means," he added, "are what this country are [sic] all about." 3 8
Lazar argues that "a liberal democracy can remain liberal democratic even while

33. Lazar, supra n. 1, at 4.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Nomi Claire Lazar, A Topography of Emergency Power in Emergencies and the Limits of Legality,

supra n. 3, at 157.
36. Id. at 159.
37. Id at 160.
38. Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Oliver L. North 744 (Pocket Publishers 1987) (statement of

Representative Lee Hamilton).
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concentrating power and derogating rights."3 9 I am not sure I agree. But even if we could
write an optimal piece of framework legislation that could do this, humans being
humans, the risk for abuse would simply magnify. If we really are in an age of
permanent emergency, and if we really must fundamentally sacrifice some measure of
our complex, inefficient participatory process, then I find Lazar's a thoughtful and
compelling argument, and perhaps a direction we might have to consider, but it does
make me nervous.
Indeed, both of these volumes make me very nervous indeed. While I am
confident that we can design more effective institutions, and we can sketch out
wonderful framework legislation on paper, ultimately, none of this will do much good and by providing formal sanctions, rules, and regulations may even do some real harm.
Frankly, I would prefer to be in a system where if anyone is going to be nervous it is the
leaders and not the led. Leaving some measure of ambiguity will help, and paying
attention to fortifying the inculcation of values and norms will, I think, help a lot.
These volumes go a very long way to pushing us to think through these most
important challenges, and precisely because they address the deeper questions involved
here, they will (and should) have a long shelf-life.

39. Lazar, supra n. 1, at 136.
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